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INTRODUCTION
Animals’ long-standing status as property serves to
hinder many attempts to secure rights and protections for
animals in the legal arena. Even within the realm of
property law, states vary on how animals are viewed and
protected. 1
Because of these long-held views and
inconsistencies, the rights of animals are not taken as
seriously as is warranted. Moreover, a person’s interest in
animals has been trivialized, especially regarding the ability
to obtain standing in a legal proceeding. 2 The interests of
animals and their rights would be furthered if a greater
significance were placed on people’s interests in them.
This Comment will explore the different ways animals
are viewed and treated in the legal world. It will focus on
how these views affect the concept of people having a valid
legal interest in animals and their rights, and whether or not
that interest should create standing in courts. Part I of this
Comment will lay a foundation describing how animals are
viewed throughout the states as property and the different
rights afforded to them. 3 It will explain legislation and cases
that show the inconsistencies of the states and the courts.
Part II will identify the legal problem that this uncertain and
old-fashioned view has created in the current legal
atmosphere. 4 Part III will analyze how the status of animals
as property has affected the significance of a person’s interest
in animals and how that interest is treated in determining
standing. 5 And Part IV will offer a proposal to help solve the
problem and clarify inconsistencies. 6 This includes viewing
1. See generally ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, ANIMAL PROTECTION
LAWS OF THE USA & CANADA (7th ed. 2012), available at
http://aldf.org/article.php?id=259 (providing a list of animal protection laws for
each state and Canada) (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
2. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding
that the plaintiffs, who had an interest in seeing endangered species in a
particular area in the future, lacked standing to sue because they did not show
the required injury).
3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part IV.
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animals as something greater than property, with their own
protected rights, and allowing animals and the people who
have an interest in them to have standing to sue in court.
I. BACKGROUND
Currently, animals are legally regarded as property. 7
However, to many people, they are regarded as something
more than a possession, even rising to the level of a family
member. 8 This legal status has caused controversy in cases
dealing with injuries or death of a family pet. 9 It has also
brought into question what precisely constitutes legal
standing in cases. 10 An animal’s property status under the
law affects the way people and the law treat them, and
ultimately hinders the advancement of their rights as nonhuman animals. 11
A. Animals Regarded as Property
Although the history of considering animals to be
property is deeply rooted in the United States, 12 people’s
views of animals and their rights have changed over the
years. 13 The value of a pet has become more culturally
7. See generally Susan J. Hankin, Not a Living Room Sofa: Changing the
Legal Status of Companion Animals, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 314 (2007)
(discussing changes in the way people value their companion animals and
advocating a change in the legal status of animals as property).
8. In Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275
(Cal. 1994), the court ruled that a pet restriction at a condominium could be
enforced against a condominium owner. Justice Arabian’s dissent states that
the pet restriction is unreasonable in light of the “cherished association with . . .
household animals,” and the “substantial benefits derived from pet ownership.”
Id. at 1292 (Arabian, J., dissenting). Justice Arabian discusses the “substantial
pleasures of pet ownership,” and how “[e]motionally, [pets] allow a connection
full of sensation and delicacy of feeling,” pointing to both the “well-established
and long-standing historical and cultural relationship between human beings
and their pets and the value they impart,” and the “well-established place pets
have found in our hearts and homes.” Id. at 1293–95.
9. Hankin, supra note 7, at 321–40 (discussing how to value the damages
an owner suffers as a result of an injury or death of a pet).
10. See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
11. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Standing For Animals (With Notes on
Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. REV. 1333 (2000).
12. See Hankin, supra note 7, at 321–40.
13. See PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 215–19 (updated ed. 2009). A
distinction between a direct duty and an indirect duty to animals can be made.
Adam Kolber, Note, Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of
Humans and Other Apes, 54 STAN. L. REV. 163, 177 (2001). A direct duty is one
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relevant. Many people with pets spend great amounts of
time, energy, and money on their animal family members,
and would be outraged to find out that in some states their
pet’s value, if injured or killed, would remain merely at its
market value. 14 Depending on the breed, age, and if the pet
was adopted from a shelter, the value of a beloved family pet
could be nominal. 15
The injury or death of a companion animal is treated
differently across the states. 16 Some states only allow
damages up to the market value of the pet, 17 while others
allow recovery for veterinary expenses, emotional distress,
and the intrinsic value of the pet. 18 For example, in a case
where a pet dog died from heat stroke while being stored in
an airplane’s baggage compartment, 19 the court found that
the owner was not entitled to recover damages from
emotional distress based merely on the loss of property in the
form of his dog. 20 The law did not allow damages for the loss
we, as people, have to animals because the animals have their own interests—
interests which animal protection laws are enacted to protect. See id. An
indirect duty is “one we have by virtue of our relationship to other humans.” Id.
Such indirect duties aim to stop “perverse human sentiments” that “increase[]
human suffering.” Id.
14. Hankin, supra note 7, at 323 (referencing one Alaska Supreme Court
case).
15. See id. at 321–32 (discussing how different states have measured
damages for the injury or death of a pet).
16. Id. at 322–41.
17. Id. at 322–23.
18. Id. at 325–41. Different courts have treated this valuation differently,
with some allowing for emotional distress to the family, some allowing those
damages only for dogs and cats, and some allowing damages for only intentional
conduct. Id. A California case, Martinez v. Robledo, 210 Cal. App. 4th 384 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2012), held that pet owners of an injured pet may recover damages of
reasonable costs of treatment, and are thus not limited to the market value of
the pet. Id. The court noted that the law “already treats animals differently
from other forms of personal property,” as the law “generally does not treat the
abuse . . . of one’s own property as a crime,” but does so for the abuse of animals.
Id. at 391.
Given the Legislature’s historical solicitude for the proper care and
treatment of animals, and the array of criminal penalties for the
mistreatment of animals, as well as the reality that animals are living
creatures, the usual standard of recovery for damaged personal
property—market value—is inadequate when applied to injured pets.
Id. at 392. This case demonstrates the shift in view allowing more rights and
value for animals as pets, based on the special place they have grown to take in
our home and society.
19. Gluckman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
20. Id. at 157.
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of companionship of an animal. 21 There was also no cause of
action in that state for the pain and suffering of an animal. 22
In other circumstances, however, courts have awarded
non-economic damages, such as emotional distress, to the
family of an injured or killed pet. 23 In one case, a plaintiff’s
dog was put to sleep at the veterinary office, and the plaintiff
arranged an elaborate funeral for the dog, with the veterinary
office to deliver the body in a casket. 24 The office wrongfully
disposed of the body, and instead sent the body of a cat inside
the casket. 25 This caused great mental distress to the
plaintiff and deprived her of the right to have a proper
funeral to bury her pet. 26 The court, in overruling prior
precedent that an animal is merely personal property, 27 held
that the plaintiff could recover damages for emotional
distress because a “pet is not just a thing but occupies a
special place somewhere in between a person and a piece of
personal property.” 28 These different views and court rulings
establish little in the way of certainty about the value and
status of an animal in any given jurisdiction. Although
commentators have suggested that the status of animals
should be something more than property, 29 no significant
21. Id. at 158.
22. Id. at 159.
23. Hankin, supra note 7, at 332 (noting that such an award almost always
involves intentional infliction of emotional distress).
24. Corso v. Dog & Cat Hosp., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 182–83 (City Civ. Ct.
1979).
25. Id. at 183.
26. Id.
27. Id. However, other courts within the state have not accepted this
ruling. See Gluckman, 844 F. Supp. 151 (1994). “In viewing a pet as more than
property, however, the Corso opinion, and the few cases that follow it, are
aberrations flying in the face of overwhelming authority to the contrary.” Id. at
158.
28. Corso, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
29. Hankin, supra note 7, at 341, 376–88, 410; see Thomas G. Kelch,
Toward a Non-Property Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531 (1998)
(arguing for a move away from the traditional view of animals as property and
towards a new status as non-property). Although animals have, at one point in
history, been put on trial and held responsible for crimes, the shift has been
made away from this idea. See Kolber, supra note 13, at 179. This history of
animal trials demonstrates that the concept of having animals in court and
having their interests represented in one aspect in the legal system is not that
far-fetched of an idea. Katie Sykes, Human Drama, Animal Trials: What the
Medieval Animal Trials Can Teach Us About Justice for Animals, 17 ANIMAL L.
273, 273 (2011); see also Kolber, supra note 13, at 180. Animals being tried in
their own cases “open[ed] up the possibility of thinking of animals as having a
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action has been taken to change their property status.
B. Legal Advancements of Animal Protections
The advancements of animals’ legal rights have become
more prevalent in both state and federal law. 30 Every state
now has laws against cruelty to animals. 31 Federal statutes
have been created to protect animals, endangered species,
and the welfare of animals. 32 Even with these statutes,
however, issues remain regarding who has standing to sue on
behalf of an animal and how the laws are enforced. 33
1. State Anti-Cruelty Laws
Each state has enacted its own animal protection laws to
prevent and punish cruelty to animals. 34 The inconsistencies
across the states, however, show a varying degree of animal
protection, with some states having more comprehensive laws
and harsher punishments than others. 35 While states are
beginning to increase and expand their anti-cruelty laws and
penalties, there are still obstacles regarding enforcement and
coverage. 36
States have broadened their animal protection laws by
expanding the types of offenses and increasing penalties. 37
States have also imposed duties on people who own animals. 38
Some laws mandate that animal owners provide proper food,
form of partial legal personhood.” Sykes, supra, at 295. In the historic trials,
“ ‘ animals were imbued with sufficient legal personhood to permit the law to act
upon them as it would upon similarly-situated humans.’ ” Id. at 296 (quoting
Anila Srivastava, “Mean, Dangerous, and Uncontrollable Beasts”: Mediaeval
Animal Trials, 40 MOSAIC 127, 128 (2007)).
30. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1333, 1337.
31. Id. at 1337.
32. Id. at 1339.
33. Id. at 1335.
34. See generally ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, 2011 U.S. ANIMAL
PROTECTION LAWS RANKINGS (2011), available at http://aldf.org/downloads/
ALDF2011USRankingsReport.pdf (providing a comparative analysis of the
comprehensiveness and strength of each state’s animal protection laws). For an
example of a determination of what is a pet, see People v. Garcia, 812 N.Y.S.2d
66 (App. Div. 2006) (holding that pet goldfish are companion animals within the
meaning of an anti-cruelty statute).
35. See ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 34.
36. Hankin, supra note 7, at 365–70.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 368. See generally ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 34
(comparing animal protection laws of the states, including laws regulating
cruelty, neglect, and basic standards of care).
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water, and shelter, as well as veterinary care. 39 However,
these laws vary greatly in their coverage and penalties across
the states, 40 creating inconsistencies and possible confusion
about the importance of these animal protection laws.
Although these laws and protections vary by jurisdiction,
there has been a general movement among the states towards
offering greater protection for animals and greater penalties
when animals are subject to cruelty or neglect. 41
There are two major complications with state anti-cruelty
laws regarding their enforcement. First, the laws are often
Enforcement is
not adequately enforced in practice. 42
unreliable and greatly depends on the willingness of the
prosecution to try the case. 43 Animal cruelty and neglect
cases are a low priority for over-worked prosecutors. 44
Prosecutions are generally only seen in the most
reprehensible cases, 45 while other violations go unprosecuted
and unpunished. 46
Secondly, state anti-cruelty laws do not generally apply
when the animal is used on a farm, in a factory for the
production of food, or in a laboratory for medical or scientific
purposes. 47 Animal exploitation in these areas often goes
unregulated, 48 and cruelty against the animals there is
common practice. 49 This distinction between animals kept as
companions and those used for consumer goods clouds the
overall concept of what animal protection and animal rights
mean to people and the legislature.
39. Hankin, supra note 7, at 368.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 365–68.
42. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1337–40.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 1339.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1339, 1363; see Taub v. State, 296 Md. 439, 444 (Md. 1983)
(holding that because “there are certain normal human activities to which the
infliction of pain to an animal is purely incidental and unavoidable,” the anticruelty law did not apply to researchers conducting medical and scientific
research).
48. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1339.
49. See Taimie L. Bryant, Trauma, Law, and Advocacy for Animals, 1 J.
ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 63, 72 (2006) (discussing the problems animal advocates
face against the exploitation of animals at institutions using them for consumer
goods).
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2. Federal Legislative Action
Progress has also been made in protecting animal welfare
on the federal level. 50 A number of federal statutes have been
passed to protect animals, endangered species, and to control
other areas affecting animals, such as humane slaughter and
conservation efforts. 51 Although the enactment of such
statutes puts animal protection laws on the map, there are
still obstacles in the enforcement of the laws. 52 These hurdles
include the lack of resources to enforce the laws and the
limited ability to procure standing before courts. 53
i.

The Animal Welfare Act

One of the most important of the federal animal law
statutes is the Animal Welfare Act of 1970, which was
amended in 1976. 54 The Animal Welfare Act (AWA) aims to
ensure humane handling and treatment of animals, with
minimum requirements of care regarding food, water,
housing, transportation, shelter, sanitation, and animal wellThe United States Department of Agriculture
being. 55
(USDA) is designated to enforce the statute, which has been
criticized as being ineffective and underenforced. 56
One limitation to the enforcement of the AWA is the
USDA’s lack of resources. 57 Because the AWA is only subject
to public enforcement, private actors must rely on the USDA
to use its limited budget to bring an action. 58 This has proved
to be unreliable. 59 Private citizens and the affected animals
do not have the ability to sue for wrongdoings. 60 Courts have
held that the AWA “does not create a private cause of action
and that Congress intended that only the Secretary of
50. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1339.
51. Kelch, supra note 29, at 542–44.
52. Id. at 532, 543.
53. Id.
54. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2156 (2006). See generally Michael Hill, The Animal
Enterprise Terrorism Act: The Need for a Whistleblower Exception, 61 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 651, 658–61 (2010).
55. Hill, supra note 54, at 660; Kelch, supra note 29, at 542; Sunstein, supra
note 11, at 1341.
56. Hill, supra note 54, at 661; Kelch, supra note 29, at 543; Sunstein, supra
note 11, at 1363–64, 1366.
57. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1364, 1366.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1342.
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Agriculture be able to enforce the law.” 61 The claims of
private citizen alleging violations of the AWA often go
unanswered. 62
Another restriction of the AWA is the narrow scope of its
application. The sections governing animal research only
apply to a select number of warm-blooded animals, excluding
many others. 63 Animals used for food and clothing production
on farms are left unprotected under the AWA, as well as in
many states where they are not subject to state anti-cruelty
laws. 64 Though important, the AWA by no means offers fail
proof protection for America’s animals.
ii. The Endangered Species Act
Another federal statute aimed at protecting the rights of
animals is the Endangered Species Act of 1973. 65 The statute
was created to offer protection against extinction to
endangered or threatened species. 66 The Endangered Species
Act (ESA) differs from the AWA in enforcement because it
allows for a citizen-suit—in other words, it authorizes an
individual person to sue for a violation of the Act. 67 This
gives people more power to ensure the enforcement of an
animal protection law, but it comes with its own obstacles.
Even though a citizen may bring suit, acquiring standing
before a court still remains a challenge. 68
C. What Constitutes Standing
A major controversy in enforcement of animal protection
laws is that it is often difficult to obtain standing in courts
under the federal statutes. 69 There is confusion as to when
61. Zimmerman v. Wolff, 622 F. Supp. 2d 240, 243–44 (E.D. Pa. 2008)
(holding that the AWA does not provide a private cause of action).
62. See id.
63. 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (2006); Hankin, supra note 7, at 366; Sunstein, supra
note 11, at 1342. The AWA only applies to certain animals, and excludes birds,
rats and mice, horses not for research, and farm animals. See 7 U.S.C. §
2132(g).
64. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1342.
65. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1543 (2006).
66. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1339.
67. Hill, supra note 54, at 665.
68. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because they did not show a sufficiently
imminent injury).
69. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1334.

MORRISH FINAL

1136

3/4/2014 3:24 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

standing is available and when it is lacking. 70 A person suing
under a federal statute must sufficiently meet each standing
requirement, and if one is missing, that person may not bring
the suit. 71 Animals on the other hand, have generally not
been able to acquire standing in their own right. 72 These
restrictions place a burden on the enforcement of the statutes,
and ultimately, on the rights of animals. 73
1. Constitutional Requirements of Standing
For a person to have standing to bring suit in a federal
jurisdiction,
they
must
sufficiently
satisfy
three
requirements 74: (1) the complaining party must have an
injury in fact, (2) there must be a causal connection between
the conduct and the claimed injury, and (3) the injury must
be redressable by the courts. 75 The first requirement is that
the party suing must have an injury in fact, necessitating a
“concrete and particularized” harm to that individual, and an
“actual or imminent” violation of a legally protected
interest. 76 The alleged injury may not be “conjectural” or
“hypothetical.” 77 The second causal connection requirement
means that the injury must be traceable to the alleged
misconduct. 78 The third requirement dictates that it must be
“likely” that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
outcome by the courts. 79 These requirements, however, have
presented difficulties when trying to assert standing based on
70. Id.
71. See Kelch, supra note 29, at 535; see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972). Justice Douglas’ dissent in Sierra Club stated that inanimate
objects are sometimes parties to litigation, that “[t]he voice of the inanimate
object . . . should not be stilled,” that people should be able to speak on their
behalf, and that “all of the forms of life . . . [should be able to] stand before the
court—the pileated woodpecker as well as the coyote and bear, the lemmings as
well as the trout in the streams.” Id. at 742, 749, 752 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
72. Hill, supra note 54, at 664; see Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea World Parks & Entm’t, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d
1259 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (finding that the named orca whales in the suit lacked
standing to sue because they did not have a legally protected right based on
statutory interpretation).
73. See Hill, supra note 54, at 665.
74. Kelch, supra note 29, at 535.
75. Id.
76. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 561.
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an interest in animals. 80
2. Standing for Persons Suing Under Federal Statutes
When suing under a federal statute, the complaining
party must assert an injury to a legally protected interest in
order to bring the suit in court. 81 This interest may be
aesthetic, recreational, or ecological. 82 Some statutes, like the
ESA, give private citizens a right to sue through a citizen-suit
provision. 83 Others, like the AWA, do not have such an
avenue for private enforcement and it is up to the government
to protect the interest outlined in the statute. 84
In animal protection suits, courts differ in allowing
standing based on the circumstances surrounding the
plaintiffs’ stated interests in the animals. 85 In one case, a
plaintiff had standing under the AWA because he sufficiently
fulfilled the three standing requirements. 86 His alleged
injury was to his aesthetic interest in observing animals in
humane conditions at a zoo he frequented. 87 He was also
involved in several animal organizations. 88 The court held
that the plaintiff had standing, as “people have a cognizable
interest” in viewing animals being humanely treated. 89
In another case, however, an organization lacked
standing for failing to allege the required injury. 90 The
organization claimed that the Navy’s shooting of goats on
their own land negatively affected the organization’s cause. 91
The court held that the organization did not have standing
80. Id. at 562–64.
81. Id. at 560.
82. Kelch, supra note 29, at 535; Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1348.
83. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2006).
84. 7 U.S.C. § 2146 (2006).
85. Compare Animal Prot. Inst. of Am. v. Hodel, 860 F.2d 920 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that an association did have standing because they had a special
interest in the animals that are protected by the statute), with Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing because
they did not sufficiently allege that their corporation or its members would be
injured by the alleged misconduct).
86. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc., v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
87. Id. at 429.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 433.
90. Animal Lover’s Volunteer Ass’n v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937 (9th Cir.
1985).
91. Id. at 938.
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because it did not show that its members would suffer
injury. 92 The court stated that “[a] mere association of
organizational interest in a problem” was not enough to allege
the required injury for standing. 93 “A general contention that
because of their dedication to preventing inhumane treatment
of animals, . . . members will suffer distress if the goats are
shot d[id] not constitute an allegation of individual injury.” 94
Thus, the court did not find that the harm caused by shooting
the goats created the injury needed, even though the
members had a special interest in the humane treatment of
the goats. 95
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 96 the United States
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing
to sue because they did not show a sufficiently imminent
injury and did not claim that the injury would be redressable
by the Court’s decision. 97 The plaintiffs sued under the ESA,
alleging that they would one day want to travel to see the
endangered species in the wild, and the federally funded
activities in foreign countries would likely increase the
animals’ rate of extinction. 98 The Court was not swayed. 99
The injury was not sufficiently applicable to the plaintiffs
directly. 100 The Court held that the injury to the plaintiffs
was not imminent. 101 The “some day” intentions to travel
were inadequate for standing purposes. 102 The Court needed
a more specific and concrete plan from the plaintiffs to show
the imminence and actual injury required for standing. 103
The Court also held that the plaintiffs lacked standing
due to their failure to show redressability. 104 The injury
would not be remedied by the Court’s decision because the
agencies funding the alleged misconduct were not parties to
the action, therefore, the Court’s ruling would not affect their
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Id.
Id. at 562.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 564.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 568.
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actions. 105
Additionally, the Court discredited the plaintiffs’ “animal
nexus” theory, by which “anyone who has an interest in
studying or seeing the endangered animals anywhere on the
The Court stated that it was
globe has standing.” 106
unacceptable that anyone who observes an endangered
species anywhere in the world “is appreciably harmed by a
single project affecting some portion of that species with
which he has no more specific connection.” 107 The Court
rejected the notion that a “person with an interest in an
animal automatically has standing to enjoin federal threats to
that species of animal, anywhere in the world.” 108 Further,
the Court did not see why “such an interest in animals should
be different from such an interest in anything else that is the
subject of a lawsuit.” 109 Thus, the plaintiffs’ interest in the
animals and their general intention of seeing them in the
future was not enough for the Court to confer standing in that
case. 110
However, in another case under the ESA, a plaintiff
obtained standing because he demonstrated that the alleged
injury was imminent and established redressability. 111 The
plaintiff previously worked with the elephants of the Ringling
Brothers and Barnum and Bailey Circus, where he developed
a “strong, personal attachment to the animals.” 112 His alleged
injury was that he was prevented from visiting the elephants,
now showing signs of mistreatment, because he would suffer
“aesthetic and emotional injury” from seeing the elephants in
Because of the plaintiff’s personal
that condition. 113
attachment to the elephants and his desire to visit them, the
court held that his aesthetic injury was therefore sufficiently
imminent. 114 Thus, in that case, the plaintiff acquired
standing because of his close connection to the animals and
105. Id.
106. Id. at 566.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 567.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 564.
111. Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. &
Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
112. Id. at 335.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 338.
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his imminent intent to visit them. 115
3. Standing for Animals to Sue in Their Own Name
Animals themselves generally do not have standing to
sue in their own right. 116 Legally considered to be property,
animals do not have a legally protected interest under which
to sue. 117 States may vary on the issue of animal owners’
rights and bystanders’ rights, but this Comment focuses on
federal animal protection rights. Because Congress confers
standing upon persons, animals lack standing to sue because
they are not considered persons under the law (unlike minors
or corporations). 118 No statute currently confers standing
upon animals on their own behalf. 119 Although some courts
have held that animals cannot bring suits as named
plaintiffs, in an increasing number of cases, animals are
doing just that. 120
In one such case under the ESA, Palila v. Hawaii
Department of Land and Natural Resources, 121 an endangered
species of bird was a named plaintiff. 122 The court stated that
the Palila, “a party to this proceeding” who was represented
by attorneys, “has a legal status and wings its way into
federal court as a plaintiff in its own right.” 123
Courts’ contrasting views regarding precisely what
circumstances afford standing and who can invoke it leave
the enforcement of animal protection laws unclear. 124 The
115. Id.
116. Hill, supra note 54, at 664.
117. Id. at 665.
118. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1335, 1359. Inanimate objects being rightholders is seen in current law, and it may not be that far off of an idea for
animals to have certain rights—although at first glance the idea of giving
animals rights like corporations may seem scary or dangerous. See Christopher
D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 452–53, 455, 464 (1972). Rights for animals do
not need to encompass every right, or even the same rights as humans, because
they are different; but they can share some degree of protection and rights. See
id. at 457. Human animals should work together with non-human animals,
compromising for the betterment of both. See id. at 481. This would be a step
in the right direction in light of the value animals have in our society and in our
homes.
119. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1359.
120. Id.
121. 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1107.
124. For an example where standing for an animal was denied, see Citizens
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inconsistency and obscurity of the standing issue only make
the enforcement and seriousness of animal laws more
puzzling.
II. LEGAL ISSUES CREATED
The status of animals as property affects how they are
treated under the law, 125 and how their value and rights are
perceived, by limiting their ability to have the protections
that are created for them enforced and to have their interests
be taken seriously. Designated as property, animals have no
legally cognizable right, and thus cannot have standing to sue
to enforce the laws designed to protect them. 126 This, in
effect, minimizes the ability for enforcement of animal
protection laws, leaving more animals unprotected.
Individuals also face obstacles when attempting to sue on
behalf of animals and their own interests in animals. 127
Often, they cannot sufficiently prove standing under the
statute, and the statute goes unenforced, or enforced with
severe inconsistencies and unreliability across courts. 128
Animal protections are not taken seriously because
animals are viewed as property, and as such, their rights will
always fall behind human interests. 129 “Thus the game is
rigged to render a result unfavorable to animals.” 130 Even a
changing view in the value and interests in companion
animals is not enough, without further legislative action and
changes to current laws, to give animals the status and
protections that they, and the people with an interest in
them, deserve.

to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. New England Aquarium, 836 F.
Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1993) (holding that dolphins lacked standing to sue).
125. Kelch, supra note 29, at 535.
126. Id.
127. Id.; see, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding
that mere interest in an animal is not enough to satisfy the standing
requirement); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (holding that plaintiffs
lacked standing because they did not sufficiently allege injury).
128. Kelch, supra note 29, at 535.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 537. The rights of animals should be expanded legally, but also
must be put “to work with empathy, in a way that strives (despite the inevitable
limitations of a human justice system in this respect) to incorporate the
animals’ own interests and own point of view.” Sykes, supra note 29, at 273.
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III. EFFECTS OF ANIMALS’ PROPERTY STATUS ON STANDING
REQUIREMENTS
The current state of animal law is riddled with
inconsistencies, ineffectiveness, and confusion. The status of
animals as property leads to many problems concerning the
seriousness and understanding of their interests, enforcement
of protection laws, and standing in court. These dilemmas
leave animals at a disadvantage. The current laws regarding
the status of animals and their protection are insufficient due
to the inconsistencies caused by a lack of understanding of
where animal law stands.
A. Problems Resulting from Keeping Animals’ Status as
Property
The status of animals as property is based on long-held
tradition. The recent conflict and shift in the laws and
perceptions of animals is derived from the increased
awareness of animals’ rights and people’s changing view of
animals by placing greater value on their companion
animals. 131 Animals have grown in significance in the daily
lives of people who have them as pets. 132 This changes the
views and conceptions of animals. Because pet owners place
more value on their companion animals, they view animals as
deserving of more value, and ultimately more rights and
protections. 133
Inanimate property and animals vary in significant ways.
However, they are labeled the same under the law. This
creates problems when trying to apply a law to animals that
is intended for inanimate property. Animals are different
than other property—they have the capacity to suffer 134 and
to give love. People form attachments with animals that they
cannot have with other inanimate property.
This
automatically sets them apart.
The conflict arises when we are told that under the law,
animals and other inanimate property should be treated the
same. An animal’s capacity to suffer distinguishes it from
other property, which justifies giving animals protections and
131.
132.
133.
134.

Hankin, supra note 7, at 316.
Id.
See id. at 316–19.
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1335, 1363–66.
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other rights not afforded to property. 135 These difficult
concepts within animal law cause doubt and inactivity, not
only for citizens attempting to sue on behalf of animals, but
also for the courts.
The protections that would actually be afforded to
animals through properly enforced laws are insufficient and
not taken seriously in practice. This is because the property
status of animals does not accurately reflect how many people
feel about animals. 136
Laws with valid intentions go
unenforced, thus creating unsettled confusion and inhibiting
clarity in animal law.
One reason for the lack of seriousness is the failure to
have a cohesive method throughout the states of applying
value to injured or killed pets and of the coverage of anticruelty laws, which in effect prohibits the legal world from
seeing the laws and animals’ rights as important. 137 Because
there is no connection between the states, the ability to have
a comprehensive application of equal and consistent law is
shattered.
At the federal level, confusion arises because the status
of property is applied differently to different animals. 138 For
companion animals, laws vary on what damages are
recoverable for their injury or death, 139 however, further
conflict surfaces when comparing them to farm or experiment
animals. 140 The same laws do not apply to animals used for
food, consumer production, or experiments. 141
This
categorizes animals differently without an acceptable reason
and widens the gap in understanding how animals should be
treated under the law.
It is difficult to justify and comprehend that while some
animals are protected from cruelty and afforded certain
rights, other animals, because of their use, generally have no
protection against abuse and death. 142 These animals, used
on farms or for experiments, are simply a means to an end for
a human interest, which outweighs any other interest
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 1363–65.
Hankin, supra note 7, at 319.
See id. at 368–70.
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1339–42.
Kelch, supra note 29, at 537–39.
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1339.
Id.
See id. at 1334–39.
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because as property, these animals have virtually no rights. 143
This view has kept animals in an unstable world of
unjustified categorizations. Continuing to allow animals to
be exploited under inhumane conditions, solely for economic
efficiency, perpetuates the confusion between how different
animals are viewed and treated. 144 This uncertainty is
holding back needed advancements in animal law.
Because human preference will always outweigh any
animal interest, it is hard to move away from the concept of
animals as property. 145 The interests of animals do not have
much weight when there is a human interest at stake, and
animals will continue to serve human interests, as they
always have. 146 If the trend develops where animal interests
are put before our own, those interests will be taken more
seriously, and we will be able to more clearly see animals for
what they are—something more than mere property. 147
Courts have not been able to sufficiently articulate a
reason why an interest in animals is different than an
interest in anything else. 148 This makes it even more
challenging for a plaintiff to explain why his or her interest
should matter. Thus, many laws are ineffective and do not
serve their intended purpose. 149 Not being able to effectively
combat animal mistreatment only dampens the current
status of animals, preventing animal rights from being taken
seriously and advancing. 150
B. The Obstacle of Standing in Enforcing Animal Protection
Laws
Because animals are not granted standing in their own
right in any statute, they must rely on a designated entity or
a private citizen to speak on their behalf. 151 If the entity
chooses not to enforce the statute, a prosecutor does not
prosecute a case, or a citizen cannot show sufficient injury to
gain standing, then the animal is left unprotected. It would
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 1339.
See Kelch, supra note 29, at 531–32.
SINGER, supra note 13, at 212.
See id.
See Kelch, supra note 29, at 533.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 567 (1992).
See Kelch, supra note 29, at 532.
See Bryant, supra note 49, at 72.
Hill, supra note 54, at 664–65.
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seem that because an animal may not sue for itself, that it
would be simple for a person to sue on the animal’s behalf. 152
However, this is not the case. 153
Currently, mere interest in an animal is not enough to
There must be
satisfy the standing requirement. 154
something more. 155
This is where the conflict lies—in
deciding under what circumstances an interest in an animal
rises to the level needed to gain standing in an animal law
case.
This has proved to produce inconsistencies and
confusion among the courts.
This conflict can be seen in the different opinions in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 156 While the majority opinion
rejected the animal nexus approach, instead focusing on the
imminence of the injury to the plaintiffs, the concurring and
dissenting opinions struggled more with the interest in the
The majority
animal and when it confers standing. 157
opinion, in rejecting the theory which would allow plaintiffs
with an interest in studying or seeing endangered animals to
gain standing, was not able to distinguish between what a
genuine interest was and what was not. 158
Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion offered a response to
assist the understanding of the interest at issue. 159 The
distinction was offered that only a genuine interest should be
sufficient. 160 The majority however was unwilling to accept
this distinction. 161 The concurring opinion analyzed the
imminence requirement to standing differently from the
majority opinion. 162 While the majority focused on the timing
of the injury to the plaintiffs to assess imminence, 163 Justice
Stevens emphasized the timing that the actual destruction of
the endangered animals would occur. 164

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See id. at 666.
See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. 555.
Id.
Id. at 560, 563.
See generally Lujan, 504 U.S. 555.
See id.
Id. at 566–67.
Id. at 583–84 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 583.
Id. at 567 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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The dissenting opinion discussed how the distance of the
injury should not mitigate the harm done. 165 Less emphasis
was placed on the proximity of the harm in geographical
terms. 166 The dissenting opinion also did not find it necessary
to prove specifically concrete plans in order to gain
standing. 167 Requiring such a description might eliminate
standing in a variety of scenarios. The standard may be
perched too high, especially for a plaintiff attempting to gain
status on behalf of an animal by showing an injury to the his
or her interest in that animal.
The variation in these opinions highlights the confusion,
even among the Court, in determining what circumstances
authorize standing. Because members of the Court cannot
agree on what situations grant standing, it is challenging and
complicated for a plaintiff to even attempt to understand
when standing is warranted in an animal protection case.
The Ringling Brother’s elephants case 168 referenced above
could illustrate a progression in allowing standing for
plaintiffs by focusing more on the personal connection and
attachment to the animal, and the availability and
opportunity to see or visit them. However, this could also
cause even more confusion in the parameters of what
constitutes close enough in distance and what will be
regarded as a sufficiently close personal relationship.
This seems to be an underexplored topic, most likely
because of its complexity and its tendency for arbitrary line
drawing. It has the potential to be disputed among opposing
parties in animal law cases, with judges unsure of where to
settle because it is a relatively new concept for courts to
navigate. Striving for ease in acquiring standing—currently,
a seemingly difficult and intricate process—is necessary to
ensure the proper and complete enforcement of animal
protection laws.
165. Id. at 594 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 595.
167. Id. at 592.
168. Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. &
Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the
plaintiff had standing because of the aesthetic and emotional injury due to his
close relationship with the animals).
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C. Inadequate Progression of Animal Protection Under the
Law
Given the inadequate enforcement and difficulties
associated with obtaining standing in animal protection
cases, the progression of animal rights is severely hindered.169
The historical, as well as current, notion of animals as
property has lead to the perception that animals do not have
many rights, that those rights are not to be taken seriously,
and that enforcement of any of those rights carries little
priority. 170 With such little weight afforded to an animal’s
rights, enforcement by people on the behalf of an animal
should be more easily accessible and uniformly enforced.
That, unfortunately, is not how these cases transpire. 171
The insufficient enforcement of the laws further leads to
the misconception that the rights of animals, if they exist, are
unimportant. The rights and preferences of humans will
always surpass those of an animal. 172 Although there have
been changes and some advancements in animal law,
stronger enforcement of the laws and greater access to
standing is necessary. 173 Currently, the slow and shifting
progression of protections for animals is not enough to ensure
that the rights animals deserve will be upheld and
adequately defended. A new concept of animals is necessary,
one that moves beyond mere property. A status that more
accurately reflects the place animals hold in our changing
world is overdue.
IV. PROPOSAL
In order for animal rights to be adequately protected,
they must fully be understood, by both the courts and the
people. As many different circumstances involve animals and
their use, the law is not black and white on what rights are
afforded and when. Different circumstances may call for
different protections. Although there is a slippery slope
argument when giving animals rights, allowing protections
does not need to be an all or nothing scenario in every case—
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1333–38.
See id.
See Lujan, 504 U.S. 555.
See SINGER, supra note 13, at 212.
See Hankin, supra note 7, at 316–19.
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some rights may be afforded to some animals in particular
situations depending on the circumstances involved for
certain reasons (not arbitrary and confusing line-drawing).
Several changes in the law should occur so that this
understanding becomes more apparent and cohesive.
Changes in the status of animals, as well as changes
regarding standing, will help to clarify animal rights and will
allow people to begin to take those rights seriously, while
providing well-deserved protection to animals.
A. Changes in Property Status
A movement away from the traditionally accepted view of
animals as property is the first essential modification. 174 A
new status with legal rights above those of property would
help to align our currently held views of animals with the
rights animals should enjoy. 175 If an animal’s status was
considered something more than property, the animal would
be given more rights and more significance would be placed
on its interests. This would help promote the seriousness and
understandability of animal rights and the need for
protections.
Animals are different than property in many respects,
and that should be reflected in the law, as it is already being
reflected in our lives. 176 Animals are capable of returning love
and of forming strong bonds with humans. 177 Non-animal
property cannot do these things. Animals also have the
capacity to suffer, while inanimate objects do not. 178 This
capacity separates animals from other property, and calls for
laws protecting animals from undue suffering. 179 A piece of
property can be damaged or destroyed, while an animal can
be injured or killed. A piece of property can be replaced,
whereas an animal is irreplaceable as each one is truly
different.
These concepts are different and should be
reflected in the law through a status for animals that is above
property and affords animals more rights.

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See Kelch, supra note 29, at 531–37.
See Hankin, supra note 7, at 316–19.
Id.
Id. at 346, 376, 379–80, 387.
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1335, 1363–66.
Id. at 1363–65.
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Although this proposition will help bring awareness and
seriousness to animal rights, it may be hard to implement.
Turning away from the historically accepted principle of
animals as property would be a confusing and difficult task.
It would be hard to determine exactly what the status of an
animal is and in what ways exactly it differs from mere
property. However, this is a necessary change for the
progression of animal rights. Animal rights will not be taken
seriously or grow if animals are incorrectly labeled as
property by the law.
Another necessary change to help the advancement of
animal rights is a unifying set of rules regarding animal care
and cruelty to be used throughout all of the states. 180 A
federal law that offers standing more easily should be enacted
to unite the conflicting state laws that tend to diminish the
impact and importance of animal rights by being so diverse
and inconsistent among the states. 181
Because the status of property fails to accurately convey
the value animals have or their rights that deserve to be
recognized, more needs to be done in making people, the
legislature, and courts aware of these rights. This way, the
rights will be better understood and taken more seriously,
and therefore better applied, and the animals will be better
protected.
A step in the right direction is allowing an animal to be a
named party in a case—as in Palila, 182 discussed above,
where a bird was a named plaintiff. 183 This gives the animal,
and therefore its cause, greater significance. If more animals
were named as plaintiffs in animal protection suits, and it
became more common to recognize animals in lawsuits, then
animal rights would deservingly gain greater ground. The
prominence and recognition in the legal community would
give animal law the push it needs to continue to progress and
serve animals.
Maybe if more people saw animals named as parties in
lawsuits, they would not think of animals as merely property
anymore because property cannot sue. There is no clear
180.
181.
182.
1988).
183.

See Hankin, supra note 7, at 368–70.
See id.
Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir.
See id.
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negative implication of allowing an animal to be a named
party in a suit. The interests asserted could be the interest of
the animal itself or what would be best for people’s interests
in that animal. Naming an animal as a party only clarifies in
the minds of the people what interests are at stake—a
necessary component if animal law should continue to
progress forward.
B. A Shift in Standing
The issue of insufficient avenues to acquire standing for
animals and those with interests in animals creates problems
with the enforcement of animal protection laws, and thus
lessens their significance in the legal world. 184 There are
many inconsistencies regarding standing among the courts
that need clarification.
Greater protection for animals is needed because they
cannot protect themselves. This will come from greater
enforcement of the laws and by allowing standing in more
circumstances. If these cases are given a greater priority,
animal protection will have greater significance. More people
will pay attention to the rights of animals and take them
more seriously. Increasing enforcement and awareness will
push animal law to co-exist with other valid laws and provide
animals with the protections they need.
People’s interests in animals must also be better
protected. If a person has a genuine interest in an animal,
that interest should be protected and enforceable in the
courts. If a law violator can choose to break the law by
harming an animal, a plaintiff should have the right to
enforce the protection of that animal’s rights. It is not logical
to allow someone’s interest to harm the animal take
precedence over another person’s interest to preserve the
welfare of that same animal, which is protected by law,
especially when that animal cannot protect its own rights. 185
Even interests in the protection of animals used in farming
and experiments should be recognized. These animals should
not go without protection when there are people who care
about their rights and the animals are without the ability to
obtain any sort of significant rights in such an
184. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1334–35.
185. See id.
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environment. 186
A re-evaluation of the distinction between animals used
on farms or in laboratories and all other animals needs to
occur. It does not make sense to afford some animals
protection and not others, based on the type of animal and
what purpose they are intended to serve. This furthers the
confusion surrounding what rights animals have, which in
turn, slows down the progression of animal rights.
Finally, Congress must expressly confer standing upon
animals under certain statutes. 187 Private causes of action
should also be given to those statutes without a citizen-suit
provision so that an animal’s rights can be brought to court
directly through a private citizen. 188 This will allow for
another avenue of enforcement, thereby ensuring more
animals’ rights are preserved.
The legislature can combat the obstacle of standing by
allowing animals to sue in their own name on behalf of their
violated rights. The legislature must give a legally cognizable
right to animals in order for them to have standing. 189
Although Congress generally gives standing to persons,
nothing limits its power to give it to something else, such as
animals. 190 Congress can, and should, allow animals to
pursue standing in cases where their rights are violated. 191
Congress already authorizes standing for minors and
corporations, and should create a right to have standing for
animals too, who also have protected rights. 192 This will allow
for animals and those that care about them to have a more
easily accessible avenue through which to enforce the
animals’ designated rights.
CONCLUSION
The property status of animals severely hinders their
rights through creating confusion, inconsistencies, inadequate
186. See id. at 1339. The current federal and state laws are not sufficient to
provide this protection to animals—they simply fall short of the goals that they
were set out to accomplish. See supra Part II.
187. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1336.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 1362.
190. Id. at 1360–61.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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enforcement, and obstacles in gaining standing to sue. 193
Because animals are considered property and standing in
animal protection cases is so difficult to obtain, animal rights
are going unenforced and animals are needlessly suffering.
Awareness needs to be spread to and through the people, the
legislature, and the courts in order to highlight the
importance of and the obstacles within animal laws. 194
Ultimately, designating animals as something more than
property, and allowing animals and people with interests in
animals greater access to standing, will advance the
progression of animal rights so that they more accurately
depict the significance animals hold in our current world and
give them the protections they deserve.

193. Id. at 1334–39.
194. Bryant, supra note 49, at 119.

